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THE  UNTYING  AT  COMMUNITY  LEVEL  OF  MEMBER  STATES" 
BILATERAL  DEVELOPMENT  AID  TO  NON-MEMBER  COUNTRIES summary 
The  Member  States'  bilateral  aid  Is  still  tied  to  a  considerable 
degree,  I .e.  the  aid  Is  conditional  on  procurement  In  the  donor 
country.  This practice has  long  been  a  subject of  controversy.  In  the 
early  1970s  there  were  attempts  at  both  OECD  and  Community  level  to 
untie  such  aid  but  Initial  ambitions  had  to  be  scaled  down  and  In  the 
end  partial  solutions  emerged  that  mainly  concerned  multilateral  ald. 
A  recent  Initiative  by  the  Dutch  presidency  has  rekindled  discussions 
within  the  Council  and  the  Issue  of  untying  aid  Is  once  again  on  the 
agenda. 
The  Issue  of  tied aid  Is  especially sensitive since  development  aid  Is 
seen  by  the  Member  States  as  a  genuine  pol ltlcal  choice  that  Is 
reflected  In  their  budget  allocations  for  development  cooperation. 
Indeed,  some  Member  states  argue  that  the  tying  of  aid  Is  a 
precondition  for  aid as far  as public opinion  Is concerned. 
At  present  the  amount  of  aid  that  would  be  affected  by  untying  at 
Community  level  stands  at  some  $10  billion,  which  represents  58%  of 
the  Member  States'  bilateral  aid  and  0.25%  of  their  GNP.  But  the 
situation  Is  not  the  same  everywhere.  the  Member  States'  practices 
varying  In  relation  to  the  total  amount  of  aid  they  give,  the 
proportion  of  multilateral  aid  within  that  total  and  the  degree  to 
which  bilateral  aid  Is already untied. 
The  main  argument  In  favour  of  untying  aid ·at  Community  level  - which 
would  mean  that  bilaterally-financed contracts would  be  thrown  open  to 
all  the  Member  States  - stems  from  development  considerations.  The 
first  beneficial  effect  of  the  extension  of  competition  to  twelve 
markets  would  be  the  likely  cost  advantages  for  both  the  recipient 
developing  countries  and  the  donors  themselves.  Another  effect  of  the 
mea~ure would  be  that  donor  countries  would  be  less  tempted  to  angle 
their  aid  with  an  eye  to  their  own  exports  and  other  considerations 
often  unrelated  to  local  conditions.  lastly,  we  should  not  fall  to 
consider  the  Impetus  that  untying  aid  at  Community  level  could  give  to 
renewed  efforts to make  all  OECD  members  take similar  steps. 
Furthermore,  a  move  to  untie  aid  would  be  timely  In  view  of  the 
completion  of  the  single  market,  which  Involves  opening  up  Community 
markets.  In  this  context,  the  approach  advocated  Is  to  consider  the 
tying  of  bilateral  aid  as  a  form  of  export  aid,  so  that  It  Is  covered 
by  Articles  112  and  113  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  which  cal 1  for  the 
harmonization of  such  aid arrangements. II 
; 
The  practicalities of  untying  bl lateral  aid do,  however,  give  rise  to a 
number  of  questions  concerning: 
(I)  the  scope  of  such  untying:  types  of  flow  (official  development 
assistance  or  extension  to  other  forms  of  aid?),  geographical 
coverage  (developing  countries  only  or  extension  to  Eastern 
European  countries?),  the  type  of  tying  (sources  of  supply  other 
than  the  donor),  forms  of  aid  (loans,  grants?),  different  kinds  of 
aid  (what  about  technical  cooperation and  bilateral  food  aid?); 
{I I}  provision  for  gradual  Implementation  In  terms of  the proportion 
of  aid  to  be  untied  and  the  setting of  thresholds  or  adoption 
of  a  sectoral  approach. 
A certain number  of  the  elements  mentioned  In  this  communication  could 
also apply  to export  credits. 
The  purpose of  this communication  Is  to provide  the  basis  for  a  policy 
discussion  by  the  Council  of  the  various  Issues  arising  from  the 
untying of  aid,  with  a  view  to examination of  the matter,  as ministers 
themselves  have  requested. THE  UNTYING  AT  COMMUNITY  lEVEl  OF  MEMBER  STATES' 
BILATERAL  DEVELOPMENT  AID  TO  NON-MEMBER  COUNTRIES 
Introduction  and  history 
"Tying"  aid,  that  Is,  making  It  conditional  on  procurement  In  the donor 
country,  has  long  been  a  subJe.ct  of  controversy  In  International 
discussions.  The  first  attempts'  to  abolish  the  practice,  I.e.  to 
"untie"  aid,  were  undertaken  In  the early 1970s- both within  the  OECD, 
with  a  view  to allowing  procurement  In  any  of  the  member  states of  the 
Development  Assistance  Committee  (DAC),  and  at  COmmunity  level,  with  a 
view  to  untying  aid  only  at  the  level  of  the  Member  States.  However, 
neither of  these  Initiatives met  with  conclusive success. 
Within  the  DAC,  hopes of achieving  the  tota.l  abolition of  aid-tying  had 
to be  abandoned  In  the  light  of  the monetary  situation  In  1971  and  the 
uncertainties caused  by  the oil  crisis.  Instead,  partial  solutions were 
adopted,  consisting,  on  the  one  hand.  of  an  agreement  to  untie 
contributions to multilateral  Institutions.  and.  on  the other  hand.  the 
accession  of  some  DAC  members  to  an  agreement  aimed  at  untying 
bilateral  loans  to allow procurement  In  deve_loplng  countries. 
InItIatIves  at  CommunIty  I  eve I  were  no  more  successfu I.  The 
Commission's  proposal  to  untie  aid  within  the  (then  six-member) 
Community,  as presented  In  Its first memorandum  on  a  common  development 
policy  (1971),  encountered  Insoluble  reservations  on  the  part  of  some 
Member  States.  After  several  years,  therefore,  no  further  action  was 
taken on  this proposal. 
Since  that  time,  the  Issue  of  tied  aid  has  taken  on  a  new  dimension  -
tor  the  Community  - with  the  prospect  of  the  completion  of  the 
frontier-free single market.  With  the 1993  deadline  In  mind,  the Dutch 
presidency  therefore  reintroduced  the subject at  an  Informal  meeting of 
the  Council  at Apeldoorn  (Netherlands)  on  6  and  7  July.  Since  the  Idea 
of  untying  aid  met  with  a  generally  favourable  reception  from 
development  ministers,  the  Commission  was  asked  to  draw  up  a  paper 
examining  the  Issue  In  detail  and  proposing practical  solutions for  the 
Council  meeting  on  28  November. 
The  purpose  of  this  memo  Is  to  prepare  the  ground  for  a  policy  debate 
of  the  Council  on  the  untying of  aid at  Community  level. - 2  -
Background 
The  purpose of  untying aid 
It  Is  not  Community  aid  as  such  that  poses  a  problem  since  works, 
supply  and  services  contracts  financed  by  the  EDF  or  the  budget  have 
always  been  open  on  equal  terms  to  all  the  Member  States'  firms  (and 
also.  with  soma  variations,  to  those of  non-member,  usually developing, 
count r I  as). 
Member  States'  bilateral  ald.  however.  Is still  tied  to  a  considerable 
degree  compared  with  Community  aid  or  that  passing  through  other 
multilateral  channels,  as  Indeed  Is  that  of  practically  all  bilateral 
donors  In  the world. 
Broadly  speaking,  the  tying  of  aid  consists  In  making  the  granting  of 
aid  conditional  on  the  purchase  of  goods  and  services  originating  In 
the  donor  country.  Origin  Is  defined  In  terms  of  either  the 
nationality of  the  firms  that  may  tender  or  the  setting of  a  •minimum 
national  contentN. 
The  severity  of  the  constraints  on  the  sources  of  supply  Imposed  by 
tied  aid  may  vary  In  degree:  aid  may  be  !Inked  to  goods  and  services 
from  the  donor  country  a lone  or  from  the  donor  country  and  certaIn 
other  countries  (which  may  or  may  not  be  developing  countries)._  Often 
the  aid  recipient  Is  authorized  as  a  source  of  procurement.  Some 
Member  States  sometimes  throw  contracts  open  to  other  developing 
countries  (France.  for  Instance.  Includes  firms  from  the  Franc  area  as 
wall  as  French  firms  for  certain forms  of  financing). 
In  cases  where  almost  all  developDng  countries  are  admOtted  as  wall  as 
the  donor  country.  aid  Is  judged  to  be  ~artlal!y  untied.  It  Is 
cons I derad  to  be  unt I  ad  on! y  In  casas  where  It  caU'il  bGJ  used  for 
procurement  In  virtually  the whoOe  world.  This  basic  criterion  can  be 
t_ransposed,  muta'Us  mutandis,  to  Community  levsl,  In  t"Jh!ch  case 
bl!ataral~y-flnancad contracts would  be open  to ail  Member  Sta~es. 
Nota  flnad~y  thai  In  terms  of  lmplementa~lon  we  f!no1  a  varla'(y  of 
situations.  Most  donors  let  the  governments of  the recipient countries 
take  care  of  the  actual  purchasing  (recipient  procurement).  Thus  In 
these  casas  It  Is  tha  non-member  country.  not  tha Member  State,  that  Is 
the  body  legally  responsible  for  organizing  Invitations  to  tender. 
Some  donors.  however,  reserve  the  right  to  approve  the  conclusion  of 
contracts  and  checl<  thai  the  provisions  of  the  financing  agreement 
concerning  the  award  of  contracts  have  been  observed.  Than  again, 
there  are  donors  which  assume  the  responsibility  for  procurement 
procedures  themselves,  at  least  for  certain  types  of  aid  (donor 
procurement).  This  Is  particularly  true of  aid  In  kind  (food  aid,  for 
example). - 3  -
Wldelv  varying  practices 
The  Issue  of  tied  aid  Is  all  the  more  sensitive  because  the  Member 
States  see  development  aid  as  a  genuine  pol ltlcal  choice  that  Is 
reflected  In  their  budget  allocations  for  development.  In  this 
respect.  practice  Is  far  from  standard.  as  the  following  figures 
show.1 
The  Member  States'  official  development  assistance  {oda)  In  the  form 
of  commitments  stood  at  $25.7 billion  In  1988.  Of  this  total,  nearly 
60%  ($15  billion)  was  already  unt led.  This  percentage  broke  down  as 
fo I lows: 
nearly  30%  ($7.4 billion)  was  multilateral  aid,  which,  by 
definition,  Is  not  tied; 
30%  ($7.7 billion)  was  untied bilateral  ald. 
Tho  amount  of  tied  and  partially  untied  aid  that  would  be  subject  to 
untying  at  Community  level  Is  thus  In  the  order  of  $10.6 billion,  58% 
of  Member  States'  total  bilateral  aid  and  0.25%  of  their  GNP.  Almost 
40%  of  this  amount  falls  Into  the  category  of  technical  cooperation, 
namely  study grants. experts.  teaching materials.  and  the  like. 
These  are  but  averages.  however.  covering  widely  varying  situations. 
They  are  based  on  total  oda  (which  varies  from  0.19%  to  1.08%  of  GNP). 
the  size  of  th~  multilateral  element  (between  17%  and  64%  of  total 
oda)  and  the  extent  to  which  bilateral  aid  Is  already  untied  (which 
ranges  from  8%  to 43%). 
The  proportion of  tied or  partially  tied  aid  Is  highest  for  Italy  (88% 
of  bilateral  oda).  followed  by  the  UK  (82%),  and  the  Netherlands 
(62%).2  The  lowest  figure  Is  for  Ireland  (10%).  If,  however.  the 
untying  of  aid  required  Is  measured  In  terms  of  GNP,  the  order  Is 
different.  The  Netherlands,  which  devotes  more  than  1%  of  Its  GNP  to 
development  aid,  would  have  to  untie  an  amount  equivalent  to  0.47%  of 
GNP  (more  than  the  total  effort  of  the  UK  and  Ireland),  France  0.32% 
of  GNP  and  Italy  0.31%.  Bottom  of  the  list  come  Ireland.  the  UK  and 
Belgium. 
At  first  sight,  these  figures  show  that  the  Member  States  would  be 
differently  affected  by  the  untying  of  aid:  those  that  made  a  smaller 
contribution  to  the  granting  of  aid  could.  depending  on  the 
competitiveness  of  their  firms,  win  a  large  share  of  the  contracts 
financed  with  the  development  aid allocations of other  Member  States. 
1  The  figures  outlined  here  are  set  out  In  greater  detail  In  the 
annexed  Tables  1  and  2.  They  are  based  on  notifications  to  the 
OECD's  Development  Assistance Committee  (DAC)  and  thus  do  not  cover 
the  four  Member  States  that  are  not  represented  on  the  CommIttee 
(Greece.  Luxembourg,  Portugal  and  Spain). 
2  The  high  figure  for  the  Netherlands  Is mainly  explained by  the  high 
proportion  of  partially  untied  ald.  the  Netherlands  being 
practically the only Member  States to adopt  this practice. - 4  -
Given  that  some  Member  States  have  argued  In  the  past  that  tying  aid 
was  crucial  In  winning  public support  for  development  aid,  the  prospect 
of  untying  bilateral  aid  must  not  be  allowed  to  deter  donors  under 
pressure  of  such  arguments.  Leaving  aside  certain  economic 
considerations  that  wl  II  be  discussed  further  on,  experts'  studies  have 
shown  that  because  of  the  amounts  actually  at  sta!ce,  It  would  be  a 
mlsta!ce  to  thln!c  that  tying  aid  has  significant  macroeconomic  effects 
In  terms of  employment  or  the  balance of  payments  of  the  donor  country. 
Reasons  for  untying bilateral  aid  a~eommunltv laval 
The  main  argument  In  favour  of  untying  aid at  Community  level  pertains 
to  development  considerations. 
One  of  the  major  criticisms  levelled  at  the  tying  of  aid  Is  that  It 
Increases  the  cost  of  aid  by  restricting  competition.  One  primary 
effect of  untying aid at  Community  level  would  therefore  be  to  produce 
cost  advantages  by  widening competition  to the  12  national  mar!cets.  The 
recipient  developing  countries  - and  the  donors  -would  therefore  be 
assured  of  gett lng  the  best  value  for  money  for  wor!cs,  supplies  and 
services  financed  through  aid,  so  that  the  real  value of  the  aid would 
be  I ncr  eased  and.  where  It  Is  prov I  deol  In  the  form  of  I  oans.  there 
would  be  less pressure  to  ta!ce  on  additional  debt. 
By  untying  aid,  the  donor  country  would  also  be  less  tempted  to  angle 
It  with  an  eye  to  Its own  exports.  a  temptation which  can  cause  a  bias 
In  favour  of  financing  that  Involves  a  high  level  of  Imports  or 
proJects  designed  around  capital-Intensive solutions.  using  technology 
Inappropriate  to  local  conditions.  Freed  from  this  temptation.  aid  can 
be  geared  to  the  real  needs  and  capacities of  the  recipient  countries, 
leading  to  lower  recurrent  costs  to maintain  the projects financed. 
On  a  different  level,  untying  aid  can  help  facilitate  Joint  financing 
between  donors,  In  this  case  Member  States.  This  Is  no  small 
consideration  from  the  point  of  view  of  harmonizing  development 
policies within  the COmmunity. - 5  -
These  development  considerations  would  carry  even  more  weight  If 
untying  aid  at  Community  level  were  to  give  an  Impetus  to  renewed 
efforts to make  all  OECD  donor  countries  take similar  steps. 
As  noted  above,  the  efforts  made  to  this  end  In  the  early  1970s  were 
unsuccessful.  If  untying  aid  at  Community  level  led  to  the  talks  being 
renewed  In  the  DAC  with  success, ,the  benefits  to  developing  countries 
of  widening  competition  and  separating  aid  from  export  Interests would 
be  even  greater,  extending  to  all  tied  bilateral  aid  by  the 
Industrialized  countries,  of  which  the  Member  States  account  for  only 
around  half  (48%). 
A second,  and  by  no  means  less  Important,  effect  of  untying  bilateral 
aid  at  OECD  level  would  be  to  remove  development  aid  and  other 
associated  public  flows  from  the  scope  of  the  "Consensus•1  reached 
between  the  principal  exporting  countries  of  the  OECD  with  the  aim  of 
curbing  distortions  of  competition  caused  by  the  financial  terms  for 
credits.  The  aid would  no  longer  be subject  to the restrictions  Imposed 
by  the  Consensus,  which  are  Inspired  by  commercial  considerations 
sometimes  far  removed  from  the  logic  of  development.  This  would  also 
eliminate  one  factor  complicating  the  frequent  renegotiations  of  the 
Consensus. 
•  •  • 
In  addition,  a  move  to untie aid could be  timely  In  view of  the efforts 
being  made  to  complete  the  Internal  market.  since  It  Involves 
dismantling barriers within the Community. 
Legal  basis 
The  approach  advocated  Is  to  consider  the  tying  of  bilateral  aid  as  a 
form  of export  ald.  The  schemes  concerned would  therefore be  covered  by 
the  scope  of  Articles  112  and  113  of  the Treaty,  which  call  for  their 
harmonization.  This  would  allow  progress  towards  untying  development 
aid  to  be  made  with  less  risk  of  a  substantial  drop  In  the  volume  of 
such  ald. 
1  The  "Arrangement  on  guldellned  In  the  field of officially supported 
export  credits",  commonly  known  as  the  Consensus,  has  for  a  number 
of  years  covered  all  aid  credits  tied  to  procurement  In  the  donor 
country. - 6  -
Only  legislation  based  on  these  provisions  can  bring  the  Member  States 
to  apply  conditions  for  awarding  contracts  to  their  bilateral  aid  by 
specifying  In  particular: 
freedom  to  participate  for  all  enterprises  and  nationals  of  the 
CommunIty; 
appropriate  publication arrangements; 
measures  to eliminate discriminatory practices which  might  obstruct 
Community-wide  participation; 
measures  to ensure  that  Invitations to  tender  are  transparent. 
The  legislation  should  also  specify  Its  scope  {type  of  aid, 
geographical  coverage,  ways  of  tying aid,  form  and  content of  aid)  and 
procedures  for  phasing  It  In  (e.~.  by  fixing  the  proportion of  aid  to 
be  untied,  setting thresholds or  adopting  a  sectoral  approach). 
This  approach  does  not  rule  out  the  application  of  Articles  92  to  94 
EEC  In  cases  where  the  tying  of  aid  Is  tantamount  to state aid  within 
the meaning of  those Articles.  It  Is worth  noting.  In  fact.  that  In  Its 
"Tubemeuse~  judgment  of  21  March  1990,  the  Court  of  Justice  considered 
that  Article  112  of  tha  Treaty  dldl  not  axcluda  tha  application  of 
Art Ieiss  92  to  94.  Art lela 92  can  be  applied  case  by  case,  and  the 
Commission  Is  currently  examining  complaints,  on  the  basis  of 
Article 92.  by  companies  which  claim  that  they  have  been  excluded  from 
contracts  In  third  countries  by  the  use  of  tied  development  aid 
operating as an export  ald. 
With  regard  to  the  problem of establishing  whether  tied aid  Is  covered 
by  Article  30  EEC.  It  must  be  pointed  out  that  the  existence  of 
Article 92  does  not  exclude  the  possibility of  applying  Article  30  to 
certain  elements  of  aid  (sea  the  Nlannell 1".  QTax  Advantages  for 
Newspaper  Publishers"  and  "Dupont  de  Nemours~  judgments). - 7  -
It  should  be  noted  that  In  their  present  form  Community  directives  on 
openIng  up  pub II c  procurement  do  not  app I  y  to  procurement  by  thIrd 
countr las  (rae  I p lent  procurement).  However,  It  Is  poss I  b Ia  that  the 
Community  directives do  apply  where  the contract  Is  awarded  by  a  public 
body  of  a  Member  State  acting  as  agent  for  a  third  country.  In  cases 
where  contracts are  awarded  within  the  Community  by  a  public  body  of  a 
Member  State  (donor  procurement>,  the  dIrectIves  on I  y  app I  y  provIded 
that  the  International  agreement  concluded  between  the  donor  State  and 
the  beneficiary  State  does  not  establish  procurement  procedures  other 
than  those  provided  for  In  the  "public  procurement"  directives.  As  a 
result,  the effect of  these directives on  tied aid  Is  very  limited. 
practicalities of untying bilateral  aid at community  leyel 
In  the  light  of  the  above,  untying  Member  States•  bilateral  aid  at 
Community  level  Is an  obJective worth  pursuing  for  the Community. 
However,  besides  the  actual  principle  of  untying  aid  at  Community 
level,  there  are  a  number  of  other  questions  to  be  resolved  before 
proceeding  with  the  measure,  In  particular  practicalities  to  do  with 
the  scope  of  the  untying  of  aid  and  provision  for  Its  gradual 
Implementation. 
Untying  bilateral  aid  In  practice  Involves  setting  up  appropriate 
Instruments,  which  may  extend  for  example  to  the use of  common  general 
conditions  for  procurement,  as  Is  the  practice  for  Interventions 
financed  by  the  EDF.  This  aspect  of  Implementation  Is  not  discussed  In 
the present  document. 
1.  Types  of  flows 
The  Idea  of  untying aid  Is  normally  applied  to what  Is  termed  official 
development  assistance  (oda).  This  term,  as  used  by  the  OECD's  DAC, 
covers  flows  In  financing  or  In  k:lnd  whose  principle  motive  Is·  the 
development  of  the  recipient  country  and  which  comprise  a  "grant 
element"  of  at  least  25%.  In  addition  to oda,  there  are other  official - 8-
flo··s  (oof)  which  are  not  classed  as  oda  by  the  DAC  either  because 
tho; r  pr 1  mary  purpose  Is  not  dave I  opment  or  because  theIr  f I  nanc I  a I 
conditions  are  not  concasslonal  enough  to  attain  the  required  grant 
elemant.  A  large  proportion  of  these  oof  - which  amounted  for  the 
Member  States  to  around  $3  billion  In  1988/89  (bilateral  oof  only)  -
are official  export  credits and  therefore covered  by  the  OECD  Consensus 
referred  to  above.  Another  part  Is  probably  untied  by  the  vary  natura 
of  the  transactions which  It  finances  (bond  purchases.  ate.). 
In  as  much  as  soma  of  these  bilateral  oof  are  tied  to  procurement  In 
the  donor  country.  action  to untie aid at  Community  laval  should  cover 
them  In  the  same  way  as oda  proper. 
Likewise.  the  "aid"  component  of  such  facilities  as mixed  cradHs.  the 
UK  Aid  and  Trade  Provision.  etc .•  used  to soften the  financial  terms of 
export  credits.  should  not  be  eltcluded  from  untying.  Excluding  this 
would  amount  to untying  aid whose  consequences  In  terms of  exports were 
secondary.  while  leaving  tied  any  aid  aimed  primarily  at  trade 
promotion. 
2.  Geographical  coverage 
The  DAC  reserves  the  terms  oda  and  oof  for  aid  to countries classed  by 
It  as  developing  countries.  This  does  not  Include  the  countries  of 
Central  and  Eastern  Europa.  with  the  exception  of  Albania  and 
Yugoslavia. 
It  Is  however  obvious  that  bllat~ral  public  flows  to  these  countries 
should  also be  untied at  Community  level. 
3.  Ways  of  tying aid 
As  mentioned  above.  tied  a!OJ  need  not  be  tied  to  procurement  In  the 
donor  country alone.  Some  other  sources of supply.  Including developing 
countries.  may  be  allowed.  While  this  Intermediate tying- particularly 
partially untied aid  (which  allows  procurement  In  almost  ali  developing 
countries)- has certain advantages over  aid tied  to procurement  In  the 
donor  country.  and  might  therefore  be  treated  dIfferently  from  the 
point  of  view  of  development  policy.  It  has  the  same  disadvantages  In 
terms of dividing up  the single market  as  long  as  It  does  not  admit  all 
twelve  Member  States as  a  possible source of supply. - 9  -
These  forms  of  Intermediate  tying  should  therefore  also  be  Included  In 
any  action  to  untie  aid  at  Community  level.  However,  It  should  be 
recognized  that  this would  disadvantage  developing countries from  which 
procurement  Is  allowed,  as  they  would  then  be  exposed  to  extra 
competition  from  the other Member  States. 
4.  Types  of  aid 
At  Its first  attempt  In  1971,  the  Commission  proposed  to untie only oda 
loans  In  the  first  Instance.  This  restriction could  be  justified again 
now,  both  by  the  extra sacrifice which  according  a  grant  rather  than  a 
loan  Implies  for  the  donor  country,  and  by  the extra  benefit  which  the 
recipient  country derives  from  non-repayable assistance. 
Taking  Into  account  the  present  Importance  of  grants  In  Member  States' 
bilateral  programmes1,  however,  confining  the operation  to  loans  would 
significantly  reduce  Its scope  and  would  also  have  very  varied effects 
on  the  Member  States.  Moreover  such  a  dlst lnct Jon  according  to  the 
f I  nanc I  a I  Instrument  used  does  not  seem  justIfIed  If  one  looks  at  the 
question  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  common  commercial  policy or  the 
completion of  the  Internal  market. 
5.  Aid  content 
The  aid  may  be  In  kind  (food  aid  Is  a  typical  case)  or  In  the  form  of 
financial  allocations.  It  may  serve  to  finance  specific  Investment 
projects  (project  aid)  or  a  variety  of  activities  (programme  aid, 
Inc ludl ng  sectoral  and  genera I  Import  programmes  In  part I  cui ar)  or 
technical  cooperation.  Whatever  the  case,  It  Is  the  object  of  public 
procurement  of either works,  supplies or  services. 
In  principle,  any  such  procurement  should,  If  COmmunity  aid  Is untied, 
be  subject  to  a  Community-wide  Invitation  to  tender,  assuming  that  It 
Involves exports and  that  the  Individual  procurement  (or  the  total  cost 
of  the  operation  financed)  excee~ a  certain  threshold  below  which  an 
International  Invitation  to  tender  would  not  be  justified on  economic 
grounds. 
1  In  terms  of  bilateral  commitments  (1988/89):  Ireland  100.0%; 
Denmark  97.8%;  United  Kingdom  97.1%;  Netherlands  82.7%;  Belgium 
78.5%;  France  69.7%;  Italy 63.8%;  Germany  57.1%. - 10  -
There  Is  a  problem  here  with  certain  types  of  aid  In  the  form  of 
technical  cooperation,  which  accounts  for  a  large  proportion of  Member 
states'  tied  aid  (almost  40%  on  average).  It  would  seem  that  at  least 
some  forms  of  technical  cooperation  (e.g.  education  and  training) 
should  be  excluded  from  any  Initiative  to  untie  aid,  on  account  of 
their  specific  (e.g.  linguistic  or  cultural)  requirements.  In  most 
cases,  technical  cooperation does  not  In  practice  Involve  International 
Invitations  to  tender  but  procedures  Involving  more  I lmlted 
compet 1  t 1  on,  such  as  the  restrIcted  procedure  or  dIrect  agreement. 
However,  this approach  should be  without  prejudice  to  the applicability 
of  the  public  services directive,  which  will  take effect  from  1993  and 
wh 1  ch  wIll  lead  to  CommunI ty-wt de  compet It ton  In  the  procurement  of 
many  kinds of  services. 
Another  question  Is  raised  by  bilateral  food  aid,  which  should  be 
examined  to  see  whether  It  poses  a  problem  In  the  context  of  untying 
aid  at  Community  level,  given  the  specific  circumstances  arising  from 
the Common  Agricultural  Polley. 
Gradual  lmolementatlon 
A  move  to  untie  Member  States'  bilateral  aid  would  represent  a  major 
Innovation.  It  may  therefore be  advisable  to  Implement  It  gradually. 
1.  One  way  of  Implementing  It gradually would  be  to fix  the proportion 
of  aid  to be untied,  Increasing  the  percentage  In  successive stages 
accord lng  to  a  t lmehb  liE)  to  be  determined.  Howaveiiu-.  In  ord6r  to 
take  account  of  the siie of  the multilateral  element  (which  Is,  In 
effect.  untied)  this  proportion  should  b6  defined  In  relation  to 
the  total  oda.  The  degree  to which  the  total  oda  Is  already untied 
(see  annexed  Table  2.  column  3)  sugges'is  that  the  Initial  figure 
would  have  to  be  high  (probably  around  70  to  80~)  to ensure  that  a 
maximum  number  of  Member  States  had  to  make  an  additional  6ffort. 
With  such  a  high  starting  point.  however.  It  Is  questionable 
whether  the  process could really be  termed  gradual. 
2.  Another  approach  would  be  to  fix  a  mlr:lmum  sum  for  Interventions 
above  which  an  International  Invitation  to  tender  would  be 
compulsory  for  bllateraB  ald.  This  threshold.  fixed at  a  relatively 
high  level  to  begin  with.  would  ros  gradually  lowered  until  It 
reached  a  floor  below  which,  for  economic  raasons,  other  forms  of 
adJudication  Involving  less  CQmpetltlon  would  be  mora·  approprlata. 
3.  A third  tack,  which  could  be  combined  with  tha  second,  would  be  to 
adopt  a  sectoral  approach:  either  defining  areas  which  would 
gradually  be  untied,  or  distinguishing  uaxcluded"  sectors  which 
would  gradually  be  Integrated  Into  the  mechanism  of  untying  ald. 
Whichever  method  Is  adopted,  In  practlcs  this  approach  would  lead 
to  each  Member  State  protecting  Its  own  sensitive  sectors  first, 
which  would  render  the exercise meaningless. TABLE  :  1 
TYINO  STATUS  OF  OOA,  1988  (•) 
-base  :  commltmente,  excluding  admlnlatratlve coete-
Multi lat.  Untied  Total  Tled(b)  Partial  I~  Tied  (b)  and  Partially 
OOA  bllat,  untied  bllat  untied(  a  untied (o)  bilateral 
OOA(o)  ODA  ODA  bllot.ODA  ODA 
1  2  3(1+2)  4  5  6(4+5) 
8  (292.0)  (190.0)  (482)  (250,0)  (-)  (250.0) 
OK  413.0  441.0  854,0  162.0  9.0  171.0 
F  1265.0  3130.0  4395.0  2805.0  242.0  3047.0 
0  1876.0  2615.0  4491.0  2160.0  - 2160.0 
IRL  34.0  (17.0)  (51,0)  (  2,0)  (-)  (2.0) 
I  1546.0  365,0  1911.0  2594.0  - 2594.0 
NL  723.0  865.0  1388.0  255,0  814.0  1069.0 
UK  1256.0  281.0  1537.0  1329.0  - 1329,0 
TOTAL  7405.0  n04.0  15109.0  9557.0  1065.0  10822.0 
(•)No  data  are available  for  Greece,  Luxemburg,  Portugal  and  Spain,  which  ore  no  DAC  membera. 
(a)  Fully  and  freely available  for  eaeentlolly world-wide  procurement. 
US$  million 
Techn.  Co-operation 
lncfuded  In  col.6 
7 
(140.0) 
9.0 
1816.0 
732.0  -
442.0 
306.0 
636.0 
4081.0 
(b)  Mainly  old tied to procurement  In  the donor  country,  but  oleo  Include•  amount•  available  for  procurement 
In  several  countries,  but  not  widely  enough  to qualify aa  •partially untied•. 
(c) Contributions  available  for  procurement  fro~ donor  and  aubetantlally all  developing  countrlee, 
(  )  Indicates  CAC  Secretarlate eetlmates. 
Source  :  OAC/OCDE. 
Total  ODA 
8(3+5) 
(733.0) 
1025.0 
7442.0' 
6651.0 
53.0 
4505.0 
2458.·0  · 
2866.0 
25733.0 
I 
,. 
~ 
~ 
' TABL~ :  2 
TYING  STATUS  OF  OOA,  1988  (o) 
-baoo:co~lt~onto,oxol.  ad~lnlotrotlvo eoets-
percentages 
Mu It II at.  Untied  'i'oh!l  Tlod  (b)  and  Partially  'i'0chn.  Co-operation  Total  OOA 
ODA  bll at.  untied  un~lod (c)  bllotorol 
ODA(o)  ODA  OOA 
Percent  o~ total  ODA  %  0~  z  0~ bll.  Z oi  %of  Tied  end  Partially  percent  of  GNP 
Tot.ODA  ODA  GNP  untied bllot.  ODA 
8  (39,9)  (25.9)  (85,8)  (34. 0  (56,8)  (®.16)  (58,0)  (0.48) 
DK  40.::1  43.®  83.3  H~.  '?  21.9  ®.  ~'?  5.3  0,99 
f  17.0  42.1  69.1  40.9  49.3  ®.32  59.8  0.78 
D  28.2  39.3  1117.6  32.6  45.2  ®.18  33.9  0.55 
IRL  El4.1  (32.1)  (98.2)  (3.8)  (10.6)  (9.91)  (-)  0.19 
I  34.3  8.1  42.4  61.@  81.1  9.31  17.0  0.55 
NL  29.4  27.1  .  : 56.5  43.6  1111.6  ®.4t  28.8  1.08 
UK  43.8  9.8  'c.SJ,a  46.4  a  82.5  ®.16  47.9  0,35 
TOTAL  28.8  29,9  68.1  41,3  58.0  0.25  38.4  0.60 
(o)No  data  oro  avollcblo  ~or Crocco,  Luxemburg,  Portugal  end  Spain,  ~hleh oro  no  DAC  mombers, 
(a)  fully  and  frooly avallcblo  for  oooontlolly  ~orl~ldo procuros0nt. 
(b)  Mainly  old  tlod to  ~roouro~ont In  tho  donor  country,  but  oloo  lnoludoo  amounts  ovcllcble for  procurement 
In  oovorol  countrleo,  but  not  ~ldoly enough  to  qualify co  0portloily untloda. 
(c)  Contrlbutlono  available  ~or  pr~euro8ont  ~rom donor  end  oubotantJally @II  dovoloplng  countries. 
(  )  lndlcaton  OAC  Sgerotarlato  ootl~atoo. 
Sourcg  :  DAC/OCOE. 
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